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Nicholas B. Dirks 
T h e  Vila san Girolamo, built to protect.inhabitants fiom the flesh of the devil, had the look of a 
besieged fortress, the limbs of most of the statues blown off during the first days of shelling. There 
seemed little demarcation between house and landscape, between damaged building and the b d  
and shelled remnants of the earth... ~e- the kitchen and the destroyed chapel a door led into 
an oval-shaped library. The space inside seemed safk except for a large hole at portrait level in the 
far wall, caused by mortar-shell attack an the villa two months earlier. The rest of the room had 
adapted itselfto this wound., accepting the habits of weather, evening stars, the sound of birds. 
There was a sofa, a piano covered in a grey sheet, the head of a stuffed bear and high walls of 
books. The shelves nearest the tom wall bowed with the rain, which had doubled the weight of the 
books. Lightening came into the room too, again and again, i%hg across the covered piano and 
carpa" 
Michael OndaatJe, The English Patient 
The English patient of Ondaatje's novel is a man bunt black beyond recognition, 
beyond identity. Cared for by a shell-shocked Canadian nurse, he lies in the V i i  san 
Girolamo, a bombed out ruin in the hills north of Florence, a structure that once housed a 
nunnery and then the Germans. They mined the place when they left, only to have it taken 
over by the Allies as a hospital and morgue. By the time the novel opens, the only patient 
left is a man who has forgotten his name, and lost his history. His body, iconic in early 
passages of the body of Christ, reveals nothing in its charred flesh. His sense of self is 
anchored only in the fi-agrnentary narratives of his life in the desert and his marginal notes 
and diary entries inscribed on the margins and in the added pages of his one possession, a 
battered copy of The Histories by Herodotus. His stories fill the villa during the days just 
after the cessation of war in Europe, his life the vehicle for Ondaatje's extraordinary elegy 
on the decline and fall of Western civilization. 
.If Herodotus and Florence together signify the best of the West, the great 
moments of Western self-invention and achievement, the rise of history and art, the 
triumph of beauty and reason, the English patient is the ideal subject of the Enlightenment. 
He is also the exemplar of colonial knowledge and the epitome of colonial adventure. An 
expert on the desert, he knows the Bedouin, as only colonial agents could': "I am a man 
who can recognize an unnamed town by its skeletal shape on a map ... So I knew their place 
before I crashed among them, knew when Alexander had traversed it in an earlier age for 
this cause or that greed. I knew the customs of nomads besotted by silk or wells ... When I 
was lost among them, unsure of where I was, all I needed was the name of a small ridge, a 
local custom, a cell of this historical animal, and the map of the world would slide into 
place (18,19)."* There was no uncertainty, no resistance, no self-doubt; the cartography of 
colonial knowledge was total and absolute, no fi-agment less than the sign of the whole. 
I am grateful to Adela Pinch, Marilyn Ivy, Janaki Bakhle, Peter van der Veer, and Val Daniel for 
extensive conversations about an earlier draft of this essay. 
* AU page numbers come fiom the Vintage International Edition, New Y~rk, 1993. 
Colonial knowledge was also, so the claim went, disinterested. The English 
patient went to the desert, with other English fiends, because of his love of untamed 
spaces: 'We seemed to be interested only in things that could not be bought or sold, of no 
interest to the outside world (143)." But iflcnowledge was pure, if only in its originary 
enlightenment conceit, it was soon overtaken by war and the imperatives of nation states. 
Madox, the patient's best friend through ten years of desert exploration, could not bear 
the onset of war, the way it divided him fiom his small circle of friends, the noise it 
brought to his quiet fantasy of the desert: "And Madox returned to the village of Marston 
Magna, Somerset, where he had been born, and a month later sat in the congregation of a 
church, heard the sermon in honour of the war, pulled out his revolver and shot b K . .  
Yes, Madox was a man who died because of nations (240,242)." Clifton, who had joined 
the desert party on a lark after Oxford and marriage, turned out to be an intelligence 
officer for the British, his accumulated knowledge of the desert an added advantage once 
war was declared. And the English patient, well, he wasn't really English, after all. His 
story, Grst told in fiagrnents that gave nothing away, was finally extracted during a long 
session of morphine, administered by Caravaggio the thiefj who had used his skills for the 
counter-intelligence efforts of the British, and then, in the aftermath of war, followed his 
old famiiy fiiend Hana, the nurse, to the villa. The English patient was in hct Hungarian, 
and had turned to help the Germans after the onset of war, guiding spies such as Rommel 
across the great North Atiican desert. Caravaggio, with a thief s expertise in disguise, 
deduced his identity fiom the stories he first heard, having followed Almasy's case when 
he was posted in Cairo. But he could not have guessed the contingence of Almasy's 
betrayal. 
Onciaatjess novel at first seemingly seduced by the omniscience of colonial 
knowledge, traces its inexorable progression to the nuclear explosions over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. In the end, the novel - and this is where the true difference lies between fiction 
and history - is a romantic tale, writ small. Almasy had Wen in love with Clifton's wife 
when she seductively recited l ies fiom Herodotus by desert campfire. It was an ancient 
story of betrayal, first by a husband of his wife, and then in return of a wife who conspires 
with the man her husband had chosen to see her naked in order to appreciate the beauty of 
his wife. As Almasy said when he narrated this story of f i g  in love: 'Words, 
Caravaggio. They have a power (234)." History turned into romance through the 
seduction of language. But desire folds back into history when the story continues, for 
Almasy chose to side with the Germans only because the English suspected him, refking 
to help him when he crawls into a military camp fiom a ruined desert crying out for them 
to rescue Katherine, whom he names, wrongly, as his wife. Though her husband is now 
dead, victim of a suicide crash that sought to take his wife and her lover to the next world 
with him, Almasy is unable to speak the husband's name, a name resonant with English 
upper class credential and military significance. And so he'cannot save the woman he 
adores, and in retreat joins the enemy. Madox and Clifton die fi-om broken hearts, 
Katherine fiom the misrecognition of war, and Almasy fades away (his colonial knowledge 
of the desert the means of his escape), only to be burned black, beyond recognition. When 
Alrnasy finally tells his tale, he has moved beyond desire, for either morphine or memory. 
Strangely, without memory all he can do is read the history of Herodotus. And he comes 
to his end, for his death is just a matter of time, a romantic who could not accept the 
inevitable appropriation of his knowledge and life: "We die containing a richness of lovers 
and tribes, tastes we have swallowed, bodies we have plunged into and swum up as if 
rivers we have hidden in as if caves. I wish for all this to be marked on my body when I 
am dead. I believe in such cartography - to be marked by nature, not just to label 
ourselves on a map like the names of rich men and women on buildings. We are 
communal histories, communal books. We are not owned or monogamous in our taste 
and experience. AU I desired was to,walk upon such an earth that had no maps." 
He was, in the end, misguided. The condition of possibiity of such romance was 
the colonial map that led directly to world war after world war, not to mention the daily 
oppressions of colonial rule. And in the final scene in the villa, the English patient has a 
gun diected at him by the Sikh sapper who had also taken refbge in the villa, a loyal 
soldier who had spent the war dellsing unexploded bombs. He held his gun on the 
English patient after hearing about the explosion of the atomic bomb, a bomb he could 
never d e h e .  Holding the charred throat in the rifle's sight, he says: "My brother told me. 
Never turn your back on Europe. The deal makers. The contract makers. The map 
drawers. Never trust Europeans, he said. Never shake hands with them. .But we, oh, we 
were easily impressed-by speeches and medals and your ceremonies. What have I been 
doing these last few years? Cutting away, dehsing, limbs of evil. For what? For this to 
happen (284-85)" And when Caravaggio shouted out that the English patient was not 
English, it did not matter at all, though the sapper left him unharmed, returning home 
instead, though with his own troubling memories of Hana, his lover, to disturb the simple 
pleasures of his own national awakening. 
The Florentine villa is still a ruin. The majestic mansion built by culture was 
hollowed out by the middle of the century, destroyed fiom within by the convulsions of 
world war, dismantled fiom without by the relentless historical logic of decolonization. 
Until the war it was possible for many to still believe the truth of Mathew Arnold's 
pronouncements on the relationship of culture and anarchy. For Arnold, culture was not 
just the irrelevant preoccupation of the pedant, of interest only to "a critic of new books or 
a professor of belles lettres." Neither was culture of concern only to the upper classes. 
Culture was about the pursuit of perfection, about the contemplation of and devotion to 
sweetness and light: "It seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that has been 
thought and known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an 
atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses them itself, 
&ely.'"' Culture was thus, for Arnold, a "social idea:" "the men of culture are the true 
apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for 
difkhg, for making prevail, for carrying fiom one end of society to the other, the best of 
knowledge, the best ideas of their time."' These men of culture must strip the discourse of 
culture of all jargon and cant, humanizing and difFusing the benefits of culture for all. But 
the more Arnold argues, the more it becomes clear how limited his notion of equality is: 
the masses should have culture disseminated to them by the "men" of culture in order to 
stem the inherent anarchy of the crowd. Culture, which is both animated by religious 
Mathew Arnold, Culture and Anarchv, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 68. 
4 p. 70. 
p. 70. 
impulses and the modem substitute for religion, "is the most resolute enemy of 
And culture combats anarchy not just through its celebration of the sublime, but because it 
teach& us to nourish "great hopes and designs for the state."' If culture is religion, the 
state is the new citadel of the sacred: "Thus, in our eyes, the very fhmework and exterior 
order of the State, whoever may administer the State, is sacred."' And so the State and 
culture conspire to check the unruly and uplift the public, to forbid both "despondency and 
violence." 
Culture in Arnold's Victorian view of the world has thus not only been tamed, but 
harnessed to the task of state control in the face of growing concern over the unruly mobs 
that threatened the pretensions and peace of a democratizing and secularizing ~ngland.' 
Arnold makes explicit the disciplining finction of cultural value and the cultural elite; it is 
of little surprise that Arnoldian phrases crop up time after time in the rhetoric of the 
conservative right in America (and Britain) today; W i a m  Bennett and Lynn Cheney both 
quoted Arnold in their recent attacks on the National Endowments for Art and 
Humanities, giving voice to the concerns of many on the right that culture is supposed to 
combat anarchy rather than promote it. But Arnold's gloss of culture - the best that has 
been thought and known - as "sweetness and light" in the service of the state and the 
"men of culture" seems not only to provide a target for the most reductionist materialist 
critique of the superstructure but to parody even the most benign celebrations of culture 
emerging out of enlightenment discourse itself. Edrnund Burke, whose writings on the 
sublime were of critical importance in the foundation of enlightenment aesthetics, realized 
that the power of culture was more complicated; Burke privileged darkness over light, 
secrecy over clarity. He also saw terror as the true source of the sublime: "Whatever is 
fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any 
sort tem'ble, or is conversant about temble objects, or operates in a manner analogous to 
terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which 
the mind is capable of feeliing."1° For Burke, the sublime has much more to do with pain 
than with pleasure. 
The sublime for Burke is not just about pain and terror, but, anticipating Kant, 
about the incommensurability of experience, at least some kinds of experience, and reason. 
As Sara Suleri has written: "Burke's famous catalog of the horrors of sublimity is thus 
strongly linked to a sense of temporal disarray, to a conviction that sequential 
derangement must necessarily attend the spectator's implication in the sublime. Ifa 
discourse of difKculty is the only idiom that will suffice to represent such derangement, 
then it demands to be recognized as clarity on its own territory, and resists a translation 
into aesthetic luminosity."" Suleri stresses the performative entailments of the sublime, 
the implication of any reading of the sublime in the yawning chasm between representation 
p. 204. 
7 p. 204. 
* p. 204. 
For a social history of the uses of culture in nineteenth century Britain, see Tony Bennett, "The 
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Social Theom Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 123-154. 
lo Edmund Burke, A Philoso~hical Enauiw into the 0rie;in of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, 
Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 36. 
" Sara Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 39. 
and event. The artifice of art calls attention to this gap; the power of representation is a 
conceit, predicated on the ultimate powerlessness of all representation But the sublime is 
equally invested in the excess of all that is signified, the hom'ble truth that both 
representation and affect fd so fir short of that which we seek to apprehend and 
understand. Culture in this view is not simple sweetness and light; art does not neceshly 
contain chaos, except perhaps in the picturesque cult of representation that took the 
, 
sublime as the banal object of desire. 
In picturesque conventions, the ruin was a sign of loss, of absence. Crumbling 
rock and fragments of shard stood for wholes that could never again be achieved, if even 
conceived. Ruins were approachable and representable, but only because they were but 
shadows of their former selves. Ruins made ancient truth both literal and literary. In 
ruins, the hollowed out shells of ancient truth appeared majestic, approachable only 
through art, painting and poetry in particular. The science of archaeology was born in the 
attempt to recover the truth of the past concretely, but the allure of archaeology was 
always predicated on the impossibility of scientific fantasy (not to mention its inescapable 
relationship to plunder, and the fantasy of instant wealth). Ruins also promised glory 
through recuperation rather than revolution, representing Burke's concern about the 
politics of the age, as well as about the relationship between history and the sublime. 
Perhaps more than anything, ruins made palpable the chasm between reality and 
representation, between desire and dejection, between now and then, lodging temporal 
alterity resolutely within the past rather than in some utopian future. The ruin not only 
housed culture, it stood for it: like culture itselfj the ruin was at once material and ethereal, 
simultaneously about history and memory, a sign of achievement and a signal of failure, an 
inspition for life as well as an intimation of death. 
If culture's cavernous lack is the site of culture's power as well as the basis on 
which culture can be wielded as an instrument of power, the ruin helps us understand why 
culture must always be linked to the incommensurable. In Arnold, culture becomes both 
didactic and inspiring, containable but dangerous. For Burke, the danger is more palpable; 
the power of culture is in part its excess, the uncontainability of the sublime. And for the 
picturesque tradition, that sought to contain beauty by conventions of distantiation, the 
experience was always on the verge of leaking beyond the borders of carefully composed 
canvases and gardens. Representation turned out to be as uncontrollable as the referential 
affects of romantic aspiration. The modem career of culture has always had to negotiate 
these tensions, requiring the convictions and investments of class power to sustain any 
confidence in the controlled and controlling uses of culture. But it is precisely these 
tensions - the quarrels over the empty spaces between representation and reality - that 
produce the t e d c  for Kant, the terrible for Burke, and the horrible for Benjamin. No 
matter where we rest our critical position, we find that culture is not quite itseK not nearly 
as comfortable as Arnold would have us believe. For us all, culture is a site of extreme 
ambivalence, whether we refer to the bin in the garden, the nude in the museum, or the 
harmony in a chorale. Now we attempt to clothe ambivalence in a different kind of 
distance, and we shift fiom the effort to describe and contain the sublime to a critical 
consideration of the political implications of the power of culture. But we are still drawn 
to culture as if it is a spectre, the ghost of a past that still excites and the haunting 
possibility of a future we think we desire. Culture eclipses temporality itself even as we 
try to historicize it. Culture becomes a trace of its own representational artifacts, that can 
be critiqued only when we are still compelled by the tem'ble pull of the sublime. As the 
impossible object of our critical conscience, culture either floats away into thin air as 
absence, or takes the form and presence of the ruin. 
In the Midraash story of the Tower of Babel, those who actually saw the ruins of 
the tower were doomed to forget the past, to lose sight of history altogether, to forfeit 
even their capacity to know themselvesu While ruins would seem to be about history, 
more often they are about the need to obliterate history, as well as signs of the death of 
history. Walter Benjamin d igu ishes  historical materialism firom the history of Fustel de 
Coulanges, who "recommends ... to historians who wish to relive an era... that they blot out 
everything they know about the later course of history."13  enj jam in goes on to write, in 
his now h o u s  passage, that "without exception the cultural treasures he [the historical 
materialist] meys have an origin which he cannot contemplate without horror. They 
owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created 
them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries."14 The ruin is the document 
of civilization par excellence; it signifies the most onerous toil of the slaves and subalterns 
who executed the political and architectural ambitions of great civihtions, and the 
history of its contemplation generates nostalgia which is the forgetting rather than the 
remembering of history, the forgetting of the conditions of possibiity of history, not to 
mention its later course. But for those, unlike Benjamin, who have traditionaliy celebrated 
culture, and civilhion, the only honor attendant upon the contemplation of ruins is that 
of shock at the decline and fall of what once was great. The ruin is the only connection 
between the wonders of the past and the degradation of the present. The ruin puts us in 
awe of the mystifications that made civilization magnificent in the first place. The ruin is 
culture, both its reality and its representation. 
If Benjamin teaches us more powexfblly than perhaps any other modem critic that 
culture is a ruin, he betrays some measure of his own nostalgia when he defines the aura of 
traditional aesthetics. In Benjamin's early philosophy he had identified the aura, or 
uniqueness, or art as the source of its value; by the time he wrote his masterfbl essay, "Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," he had reversed his view." Whether produced 
by "cult valueyy (the ritual attribution of magical value) or by the logic of exhibition (the 
public presentation of works of art) Benjamin now views the aura of art, that quality of 
authenticity and presence that produces the sublime, as an endangered species. Art 
changes findamentally once the technical means of reproduction enter the modem world 
with photography in the nineteenth century. In a flashback to his earlier position, the 
moment when the aura appears lost produces a "melancholy, incomparable beauty."16 
Nevertheless, Benjamin argues strongly that the loss of the aura opens up new possibilities 
l2 'The ruins of the Tower can be seen to this day. But he who sees them is cursed with the loss of 
memory. All the people on earth who go around saying, "Who am I, Who am I," are ones who have seen 
the ruins of the Tower of Babel." Midrash Rabbah. I am grateful to Anton Shammas for bringing this to 
my attention. 
l3 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, Fontana Collins, 1982, p. 258. 
14 p. 258. 
IS Susan Buck-Morss, The Orifin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno. Walter Beniamin and the 
Frankfht Institute, Free Press, p. 147. 
l6 Benjamin, p. 228. 
for a revolutionary aesthetic, for the politicization.and radicalization of art. Film is 
exemplary of the new aesthetic regime: h, according to Benjamin, promotes a 
"revolutionary criticism of traditional concepts of art."" By its substitution of the camera 
for the public, film loses the aura of performance; by its reproducability and accessibility, it 
makes every viewer an expert. Film embodies the principal of the mechanical 
reproduction of art, thus irrevocably changing "the reaction of the masses toward art." . 
Benjamin had extraordinary confidence in the progressive implications of the new age of 
film. 
But Benjamin's faith in the technologies of aesthetic reproduction and the critical 
capabiities of the masses (politically seK-~~nscious if also absent minded) was strenuously 
opposed by Adomo, who was fir more distrustfkl of the "laughter of the proletariat in the 
movie ho~se,"'~ and far more impressed by the capacities of the fascist state and the 
capitalist elite to appropriate the technologies of production. The argument between 
Benjamin and Adorno over popular and elite culture continues to haunt our 
understandings of culture in the final years of the twentieth century. Now the question is 
not whether culture, or the sublime, can be contained, so much as whether the modem 
technologies of the sublime will render containment that much more secure. Adorno's 
critique of the culture industry,19 composed in its most complete and polemical form after 
his move to America, still provides the most eloquent critique of mass culture we have 
today. Adorno lamented that "real life is becoming indistinguishable fiom the mo~ies."~ 
He argued that "the stunting of the mass-media consumer's powers of imagination and 
spontaneity does not have to be traced back to any psychological mechanisms; he must 
ascribe the loss of those attributes to the objective nature of the products themselves, 
especially to the most characteristic of them, the sound Adorno wrote more 
generally that "The culture industry as a whole has molded men as a type u n f i g l y  
reproduced in every product.77" Anticipating current theoretical preoccupations with 
cultural hegemony and discursive domination, Adorno wefblly dissected the ways in 
which the modem subject was converted into a consumer, a consumer whose needs, 
interests, and beliefs could be controlled and manipulated by the apparatusses of a mass 
media that produced pleasure (and incited fbrther consumption) by stifling the possibility 
of critical reflection. With polemical rhetoric still unrivalled by other denunciations of the 
conceits of bourgeois liberalism, Adorno noted at the end of his essay that the methods of 
the fascists had reached their final apotheosis in modem America, where the '%eedom to 
choose an ideology ... everywhere proves to be freedom to choose what is always the 
same.'7t3 
Using Benjaminian language, if to rather different ends, Adorno wrote that "Today 
aesthetic barbarity completes what has threatened the creations of the spirit since they 
" Benjamin, p. 233. 
l8 Buck-Morss, p. 149. 
l9 published in Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, New York: Herder and Herder, 
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were gathered together as culture and neutralized."" The culture industry has rendered 
culture nothing but style, in which the commodiication of al l  aesthetic value reveals itself 
in the reduction of art to imitation. Adorno held up older and more classical forms of 
culture in contrast, noting that "the great artists were never those who embodied a wholly 
flawless and perfect style, but those who used style as a way of hardening themselves 
against the chaotic expression of suffering, as a negative t r ~ t h . " ~  While recognizing that 
art is always ideology, Adomo saw the confrontation with tradition in classical forms as 
the contradictory space for the expression of suffering, and for the necessary admission of 
Mure through self-negation, the contradictions of any effort to transcend the particular 
limits of social existence. In this short aside, Adorno made reference to a life-time of 
critical efforts to engage in ideology critique through great works of art, in particular the 
modernist musical experiments of composers such as Schonberg. 
Adorno's commitment to the critical potential of high modernist aesthetics, and his 
despair about mass culture, was a function of his experience of the normalization and 
appropriation of a classical tradition under the Nazi regime, as well as of the apparent 
utility of mass culture for totalitarian state systems and American capitalist market forces 
alike. Benjamin's belief in the potential of mass media was forged through his fascination 
with early film, as also his political and cultural affiliation with Brecht. Benjamin was 
convinced that the loss of aura represented by filmic media would render culture both 
more accessible and more political, but even if his commitment to Marxist doctrine and 
revolutionary praxis was fir firmer than that of Adorno, it seems likely he would have 
worried along with Adorno about the production of new consumer subjectivities under the 
postwar American regime of capital, had he survived the war. The war itselfj despite 
Adomo, left traditional European culture as a ruin, both architecturaUi - many of its most 
conspicuous symbols were literally ruined - and spiritually; it was clear to many that the 
heart of European culture had in some ways led to fascism and the holocaust. Ideology 
critique seemed woefully insufficient. At the same time, the ruins of Europe paved the 
way for the emergence of American hegemony over world culture, ruining cultural 
sensibiitylpossibiity in precisely the terms laid out so eloquently by Adorno. Culture 
under the new regime became always already a ruin in the face of programmed 
obsolescence and the relentless advance of the new. After the war, culture was taken over 
by Eisenhower's military industrial complex and Hollywood's Eantasy factories. And the 
cold war deployment of modernization, appropriating all the other uses of the modern to 
the world order of American power, affiliated the new with economic power, 
technological superiority, progress and pleasure. The lure of the modem was more 
powehl than ever, and once again, the modem came as a sign of Western power. 
And so we return to the Villa san Girolamo. The Florentine shrine of culture was 
a ruin, its inhabitants shell shocked. The image recapitulates the modernist critique of the 
sublime, forceklly set in motion by Metache when, arguing that both the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian principles were conjoined in aesthetic production and experience, he took 
the KanGan tradition to task for failing to recognize that "the sublime is the artistic taming 
of the h~m'ble."~ Nietzsche's insistence on the Dionysian side of the sublime anticipated 
the later writings of George Bataille, who viewed cultural value and meaning as 
necessarily implicated in violence and excess. Focussing on rites of sacrifice and the close 
relations between ritual and war, Bataille interrogated the horror at the heart of culture, 
celebrating transgression as the fbndamental modality of the sacred. For Bataille, as for 
Nietzsche, the moment of excess was both about sexuality and about deathn And even 
here, surveying the theoretical genealogies of our current condition, Ondaatje captures this 
sad sense of the sullied sublime. .We see in his novel the necessary affiliation of love and 
violence; Almasy's love is obiterated by war, even as Hana and the Sikh sapper are tom 
apart by the nuclear explosion thousands of miles away.= Violence is what predicates 
love (in the colonial terrain of the desert, or in the ruined villa), and violence is the force 
that ultimately disrupts it. 
In the end, the English patient, the man who used Herodotus as his guide through 
the deserts of life, lay waiting for death, burned black beyond identity. He was a man who 
embodied the "best" of colonial lcnowledge and yet now lay lost in the annals of a classical 
knowledge that seemed quaint and academic. And, too, he turned out to be not quite 
what he seemed; he belonged to all of Europe, erasing the distinctions between allies and 
axis by revealing the common heritage and fbndarnental flaws of both sides. The pathos of 
his life provided the pretext for the ultimate intendment of the novel the devolution of 
cultural capital fiom Almasy and his Oxford education to the likes of Caravaggio and 
Hana, the one a streetwise though chastened thiefj the other a young and beautifid woman 
who had already seen the empty deception of the domestic dream. And even more 
significantly, the position of critique is appropriated in the end by the silent sapper, the 
Sikh fiom India who recognizes the ultimate deception, the terrible tyranny of the West, 
the translation of European colonial power into American English. The ruin that haunts 
the final pages of the novel is that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cities instantaneously 
converted to rubble by the unprecedented power of nuclear explosion. When the sapper 
returns home, he does so to join in the final struggle of the nationalist movement, to 
attempt to fiee himselfl for good, ofthe ruination of the West. 
In these remarks, I have sought to capture, or at least evoke, the predicament of 
cultural theory today, fifty years after the end of the war, during these intervening years, 
American power has waxed and waned, popular culture has exploded across the globe, 
decolonization has transformed the cartography of colonial power, and the death of 
communism has led to the demise of the cold war and the epiphany of market capitalism. 
Ondaatje wrote his allegory fiom the perspective of these transformations; in an earlier 
novel set in Toronto he had written about the historical production of subjects such as 
Caravaggio and Hana (In the Skin of a Lion), and in a personal memoir, he had evoked the 
lush colonial past that had generated his own mediated relationship with his home, Sri 
Lanka (Running in the Family). In particular, Ondaatje tells his tale fiom the position of 
one who celebrates an escape fiom the West at the same time he is irrevocably trapped in 
its embrace. Decidedly not a postcolonial theorist, Ondaatje has reflected deeply on the 
26 Friedrich Niettrche, The Birth of Tra~edv, New York, Vintage Books, 1964, p. 60. I am grateful to 
Peter van der Veer for pointing this passage out to me. 
See Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, New York: Zone Books, 1991. 
Again, I am grateful to Peter van der Veer for forcing me to bring out this parallel more clearly. 
entailments of the history and genealogy of the West for cultural migrants such as himseq 
he has immersed himself in the poetic possibilities of a colonial language at the same time 
he dreams of the authentic heat and passion of his youth; he has identified the hybrid 
formations that relentlessly enclose his own capacity for history and utopia. Without any 
explicit reference to Adorno, he exemplifies Adorno's own reflection about the 
dislocations of his life and times: "For a man who no longer has a homeland, writing 
becomes a place to live."w 
Writing may provide a sense of home, but it is decidedly not a neutral space. In 
the last fifty years we have learned how much it matters from where we write, to whom 
we write, and more generally how writing is positioned in geo-political, socio-historical, 
and institutional terms. If Ondaatje's Endish Patient can s i g n !  the monumental shifts in 
our cultwal and intellectual landscape that have been brought about by decolonization and 
resurgent nationalism, it can also remind us that in cultural theory, postcolonial critiques 
are necessary features of all the new landscapes we inhabit, or survey. Postcoloniality, in 
other words, is not just something out there, neither is it (nor should it be) simply a new 
name for a token inclusionism in our cultural business as usual. Rather, the postcolonial 
condition is the historical precipitate of centuries of western political and economic 
domination, itself enabling, even as it was enabled by, centuries of cultural and intellectual 
colonization. Postcoloniality signifies those places and peoples that resist the 
univerdi t ion of positionality and perspective, even as it underscores the extraordinary 
power of the forces of universalization. Postcoloniality reminds us of the fact that culture 
and modernity were always flawed, always predicated on violence and domination even as 
they were the terms of seduction and conquest for colonization itself." When the critique 
of the enlightenment comes out of colonial history, we remember that Burke's eloquent 
defence of good government and disinterested despotism was in the service of massive 
force, monumental greed, unsupportable grandeur. We remember that culture has always 
been a spectre, haunting any attempt to reconstruct cultural authenticities untouched by 
colonial power even as it leaves a trace of violence in every moment of historical 
imagination and political utopia. The angel of history speaks with sadness not just about 
the atrocities of the past, but the atrocity of history itself, propelled as he is into the fbture 
by the temble storm called progress.31 
The cultural field at the end of the twentieth century, from wherever we stand, is 
made of fragments. If traditional culture is still a (near) ruin, and much of popular culture 
still a (near) ruination, we have neither resolved the argument between Benjamin and 
Adorno, nor fixed upon new ways to engage the field of culture that escape the 
problematic legacies of class hegemony, colonial domination, and capitalist exploitation. 
We are still uncertain about our place as intellectuals, and wherever we position ourselves 
29 Buck-Mom, p. 190. 
I refer here, of course, to the field that has been established in the wake of Edward Said's Orientalism, 
New York, Vitage Books, 1979; for Said's most recent treatment of the relation of imperialism to 
western cultural legacies, see his, Culture and Im~erialisxq New Yo*: Knopf, 1993. 
" Benjamin writes, "The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smash,& But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the 
angel can no longer close them This storm irresistably propels him into the future to which his back is 
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress." 
Illuminations, pp. 259-260. 
we are not completely sure what these places signify in relation to concerns of 
constituency and representation, let alone the politics of criticism. The argument between 
Benjamin and Adorno continues to haunt us; we are not sure whether to find resistance in 
culture (whether "low" or "highn), to attempt to provoke subversion in culture through 
ideology critique, or to feel embarassment about the choice of culture as the field of 
criticism and interpretation in the first place. 
But we keep coming back to the ruins of culture. We may feel horrified, but we 
also feel inspired; we may feel dispirited, as did Adorno, but we cannot escape the 
rhetorical echoes of Benjamin's utopian aspiration. When we confiont the 
overdetermination of logics of cultural .production and consumption, we may nowadays 
think more of Foucault than of M a q  when we experience the excess of cultural meaning 
and signification, we may refer more to Bataille than to Burke. But we keep coming back 
We stroll across the delapidated ramparts, we climb the devastated staircase, we sift 
through the sandy pieces of shard, we back up on a grassy knoll until we can see the 
grandeur and the beauty of the prospect. But there we are, and we cannot just stand back, 
despite the fkct, perhaps because of the fact, that we now know the ruin is littered with. 
unexploded mines. When we walk in the Library we know, as did Hana, that one wrong 
step may detonate the hse of a deadly bomb. We pull books down from shelves knowing 
not what we may find, nor how old books might read again, now after the war. We plant 
flowers in the garden, never sure if the weeds we pull, or the sharp blade of our trowel, 
will trigger an explosion. We exist in a state of emergency; we live in near ruins. 
NOTES: . 
